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11 Introduction
Fifteen years after the beginning of transition, and one year after the accession of 8
transition countries to the European Union (with two more due to join in 2007), it is
worthwhile to examine whether transition has brought about a lasting improvement in the
economic well-being of the populations in transition countries. For the accession countries
and those due to join sooner or later, the additional question arises whether they have
converged on the income levels of EU members or can be expected to in coming years.
For most former Soviet Bloc countries, the fall of the Berlin wall ﬁrst led to economic
(and for some countries also political) instability characterised by severe contractions
in income levels, rising unemployment, increasing income inequality, and a worsening
of the overall economic situation (Atkinson and Micklewright, 1992; Klasen, 1994; Mi-
lanovic, 1998; Gruen and Klasen, 2001). After the transition from a command regime to
a market-oriented economy, most countries managed to return to a positive growth path.
On average, however, the growth rates have been lower than within the EU, so the relative
position of transition countries regarding income levels has not improved during the last
decade (Coricelli and Masten, 2004).
Figure 1 illustrates the growth performance of 18 Central and Eastern European transi-
tion countries. By 2002, only six countries (all of which accession countries) reached and
surpassed the level of per capita income they had prior to the transition.1 Bulgaria and
Belarus are close to their respective pre-transition income level. Together with Kazakhas-
tan, Romania, and Uzbekistan, the two new EU members Latvia and Lithuania experience
income levels that are still more than 10 per cent below those they had in 1988. Moldova
and Ukraine suﬀered from the worst income losses during the transition period. Although
recovering from these stark contractions during the last few years, in 2002, the income ra-
tio amounted to 50 per cent for Ukraine and a mere 42 per cent in Moldova.2 In addition,
the transition countries for which no comparable data is available (Armenia, Georgia,
Tajikistan, and Azerbaijan), are likely to fare similarly poorly.
The change of the economic system not only had an impact on per capita income, but
also on its distribution. Prior to transition, income inequality was very low. The ﬁrst two
1Note that this ﬁgure is not directly comparable to the income ratio for the period 1988 to 1999
presented in Gruen and Klasen (2001). Then, we used GNP per capita data adjusted for purchasing
power (WDI, 1999; World Bank, 2000), a data series which is no longer provided by the World Bank.
According to these data, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia had on average
higher incomes in 1999 than in the pre-transition period. Re-calculating this income ratio using the PPP
adjusted GNI per capita (WDI, 2004), only Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia would have surpassed their
1988 income levels in 1999.
2The overall picture does not change much when using GDP per capita, measured in constant local
currency (WDI, 2004) as the income concept.
2columns of Table 1 show how income inequality measured by the Gini coeﬃcient changed
drastically between 1988 and 2002. For all countries, except Uzbekistan, the distribution
of incomes has become more unequal. The magnitude of the worsening, however, varies
considerably across countries. Central European countries experienced relatively moderate
increases in inequality whereas in Russia, the Gini coeﬃcient almost doubled.
This paper takes a closer look at welfare in transition countries before and after the tran-
sition. It updates and extends the analysis of Gruen and Klasen (2001) which investigated
well-being in transition countries and comparable middle-income countries between 1988
and 1995. Similar to our previous analysis, we will apply pure income and distribution-
sensitive measures to measure the change in economic well-being but will expand the
analysis up to 2002. Prior to transition, socialist countries enjoyed a relatively high level
of economic well-being thanks to their rather equal distribution of income. During the
transition, mean incomes fell and inequality worsened resulting in lower absolute and
relative welfare levels. We assess the eﬀect of these trends using distribution-sensitive
well-being measures. In addition, we will also rely on subjective measures of well-being to
assess the change in welfare related to the transition. In particular, we will link measures
on subjective well-being (SWB) with data on income and income distribution to ﬁnd out
whether income inequality has a signiﬁcant impact on the way people rate their lives.
This allows us to get an alternative view on how welfare changed in a number of both
transition countries and middle-income countries over the last two decades. Lastly, we will
consider non-income dimensions of well-being to see whether they tell a diﬀerent story
from our income-based and subjective well-being measures.
2 Measuring welfare - some theoretical thoughts
There is a large axiomatic and applied literature on well-being measurement which we
will only brieﬂy summarize here.3
For international comparisons of economic welfare, real per capita income (now typically
PPP-adjusted) is still the most widely used indicator. It can be derived from utilitarian
welfare economics, but requires strict assumptions regarding individual preferences and
utility functions, particularly when comparisons across time and space are made (Gruen
and Klasen, 2003b). Particularly problematic is its neglect of income distribution which
can only be justiﬁed with the highly unrealistic assumptions of linear utility functions or
3For a more detailed discussion, refer to Sen (1979) or Gruen and Klasen (2003b).
3an equal or ’optimal’ distribution (in the sense that the ethical worth of each marginal
dollar is the same).
To remedy this short-coming, the literature also suggests a number of indicators that
combine income and its distribution (e.g. Atkinson, 1970; Sen, 1982; Dagum, 1990). More
recent empirical observation on risk aversion also supports the hypothesis that higher
inequality does have a negative impact on individual welfare levels (e.g. Stodder, 1991;
Amiel, Creedy, and Hurn, 1999).4 The theoretical arguments for incorporating the distri-
bution of income into a meaningful measure of economic welfare are multiple and well-
known (e.g. Rawls, 1971; Sen, 1984, 1987).5 But only with the recent improvements re-
garding the availability of inequality data it has become possible to apply these measures
and to conduct cross country and cross temporal studies (e.g. Kakwani, 1981; Jenkins,
1997; Gruen and Klasen, 2001, 2003b,a).
Related to this issue, a separate literature has developed that has focused on developing
and analysing subjective measures of well-being (e.g. Easterlin, 1974, 1995; Morawetz,
et. al., 1977; Frijters, Haisken-Denew, and Shields, 2004; Headey, Muﬀels, and Wooden,
2004). Subjective measures of welfare rely on the self-assessment of individuals. People
are ask to evaluate their overall satisfaction with their lives or their happiness. Subjective
well-being (SWB) therefore captures many diﬀerent aspects individuals are concerned
about and oﬀers a self-rated view on welfare.
The concept of subjective well-being has been developed in psychology (e.g. Diener, 1984)
but gains increasing signiﬁcance in economics as well. Empirical analyses conducted in
both ﬁelds of study have convincingly demonstrated that maximising happiness or life
satisfaction instead of income appears to be the most important objective for most people
(e.g. Clark and Oswald, 1995, 2002; Oswald, 1997; Frey and Stutzer, 2002; Di Tella,
MacCulloch, and Oswald, 2001, add references from psychology).
There are two pieces of evidence that inequality reduces subjective well-being. First, there
is strong evidence that relative (rather than absolute) incomes matter particularly strongly
for subjective well-being (as preferences appear to be inter-dependent) and high inequality
will increase income gaps between people with negative implications for subjective well-
being (Clark and Oswald, 1996; Easterlin, 1995). Secondly, there is evidence of ’inequality
aversion’ in the sense that people appear to report lower levels of subjective well-being in
places where there is high inequality (Blanchﬂower and Oswald, 2003).
4For a more detailed discussion on these issues, see for example Gruen and Klasen (2003b).
5For a recent study on the ineﬃciency of inequality, please refer to Schiﬀ (2004). Assuming interde-
pendent preferences, he shows that welfare declines with inequality.
4Though, shifting the focus from economic magnitudes like income to a self-rated assess-
ment like overall life satisfaction does not imply that other desirable objects become just
a means. Diener and Scollon (2003) argue that maximising subjective well-being is not
suﬃcient. Even if people report to be less happy, they still value particular components of
their life like health, marriage, work, or leisure. Thus, SWB should be considered as a in-
triguing complementary route to measure welfare but does not render traditional welfare
theory superﬂuous (see also Frey and Stutzer, 2002).
Similarly, we will complement our assessment of well-being with other non-income di-
mensions of well-being such as health, education, political and civil liberties. We do this
in the spirit of Sen (1999) who argues that these capabilities are critical components of
well-being and should be considered alongside income.
In the remainder of the section, we will give a brief overview regarding the measures we
will apply in our analysis of the inequality-adjusted income-based measures of economic
welfare. For a more extended theoretical discussion on those measures, see for example
Gruen and Klasen (2001, 2003b).
We apply four inequality-adjusted well-being measures which jointly consider mean income
µ and its distribution. They all assume that an unequal distribution of income will reduce
the level of welfare W.
W = µ(1 − I), 0 ≤ I ≤ 1.
The well-being measures used diﬀer with respect to the implemented index of inequality
I. The amount by which welfare is reduced given a particular income distribution also
diﬀers across the measures.
The ﬁrst two measures will be based on the Gini coeﬃcient G. Sen (1982) proposed the
following welfare measure:
S = µ(1 − G).
Mean income and the Gini coeﬃcient are combined to arrive at a welfare level. The
Sen measure has a sound theoretical foundation and can be derived from interdependent
preferences for which there is considerable empirical support. The corresponding utility
function does not only consider individual incomes but the entire income distribution.6
Dagum (1990) developed a variant of this measure. Preferences are still assumed to be
interdependent but in addition the Dagum measure takes up the fact that individuals
care in particular about people above them in the income distribution. The lower their
own rank in the income distribution, the higher the welfare reduction they experience.
6See also Dagum (1990).
5D = µ(1 − G)
1 + G = µ(1 − 2G
1 + G).
For a given distribution of income, the Dagum measure clearly imposes a larger welfare
penalty than the Sen measure.
When considering transfers in income and their eﬀect on welfare, the measures behave
similarly. Both are consistent with the Dalton principle of transfers. As the Gini coeﬃcient
is sensitive to changes around the mode of the distribution, Gini-based measures are
sensitive to changes that happen among the middle income group. Whether or not this
is a desirable property has been extensively debated (e.g. Atkinson, 1970; Dagum, 1990;
Sen, 1997). Also, the Gini-based measures are not sub-group consistent which is one of
the criteria inequality measures are frequently expected to fulﬁll.
To address some these of shortcomings, our analysis also includes two indices from the
Atkinson class of welfare measures (Atkinson, 1970). This class of measures can be derived
from individual independent utility functions which can be aggregated into a social welfare
function. We calculate the equally distributed equivalent income which is the amount of
income that if distributed equally would yield the same welfare level as the actual mean




















Varying the size of the parameter , the aversion to inequality factor, allows us to alter the
penalty for inequality. The higher , the greater the welfare loss. Comparing the Atkinson
class measures to the Gini based measures, the former also obey transfer sensitivity. Hence,
poorer income groups receive a higher weight and any transfer that happens among the
poor will lead to a more pronounced change in welfare than a similar transfer among the
rich. For many researchers this seems to be a more desirable property than the sensitivity
of the Gini based measures which will be greatest among the mode of the distribution.
Moreover, the Atkinson measures are sub-group consistent. Any increase in income within
a sub-population will, ceteris paribus, increase aggregate welfare. In contrast, a higher
6income received by the richest could lower aggregate welfare when applying the Gini
based measures. The increase in mean income can be more than oﬀset by the increase in
inequality. While the Atkinson measures thus appear to be theoretically more sound, the
empirical evidence appears on risk and inequality aversion as well as subjective well-being
seems to favor the Gini-based measures (Amiel, Creedy, and Hurn, 1999).
As will be shown in the empirical analysis, the Atkinson  = 1 and the Dagum measure
can be seen as benchmarks to our welfare analysis. For any given income distribution, the
Atkinson  = 1 reduces welfare the least, whereas the Dagum measure imposes often the
greatest penalty for inequality.
3 Data
We calculate the distribution-sensitive welfare measures for 18 transition countries and 16
comparable middle income developing countries and poorer EU member countries7 and
compare them to a pure income based measure to see by how much economic welfare of
each country has been reduced due to the unequal distribution of income. The income
concept used is GNI per capita, adjusted for purchasing power parity (WDI, 2004). Gini
coeﬃcients and income shares to factor in the unequal distribution of per capita income
are taken from the World Income Inequality Database (WIID, 2000), the World Bank
Poverty Monitor (World Bank, 2004), and from Milanovic (1998) who provides inequality
data for transition countries also for the pre-transition period.8
The benchmark years for our analysis of economic welfare are 1988 and 2002. Gini coef-
ﬁcients with associated distributions and, to a lesser extent, data on per capita income
were not always available for exactly these two points in time. Particularly for the sec-
ond benchmark year we had to rely on inequality data that were mainly based on years
between 1998 and 2001. Occasionally, it dates back to 1996 (Columbia, Czech Republic,
Slovakia, Spain). Regarding mean income in 1988, we sometimes had to use data for later
years which may somewhat bias the achievements in terms of income growth in the post-
transition period. The biggest compromise we had to make is with respect to Slovenia,
where income data is only available since 1993 (see also Figure 1).
7Compared to the original study (Gruen and Klasen, 2001), we included one more country into the
sample, Turkey as it is now an applicant to membership to the EU. Although not currently negotiating its
entry, the country ﬁrst approached to join the EU in 1987. We also wanted to include the other two recent
EU members, Cyprus and Malta, for comparative purposes but the necessary data were not available.
8For a critical assessment of the data sources used, see Gruen and Klasen (2001).
7The availability of Gini coeﬃcients and income shares has improved dramatically over
the last decade. Not only there are diﬀerent data sources to choose from. For one par-
ticular country, a single source frequently oﬀers multiple Gini coeﬃcients for one year.
The Gini coeﬃcients may be based on diﬀerent income concepts (i.e. gross or net income,
expenditure) and may use diﬀerent reference units (i.e. household, person, family). In con-
junction with Table 1, Table 2 shows the impact regarding alternative Gini coeﬃcients for
selected transition countries for the pre- and post-transition period. Clearly, the reported
coeﬃcients diﬀer greatly, but much of this is due to diﬀerences in income concepts and
reference units.
We therefore try to address the heterogeneity of Gini coeﬃcients by making regression-
based adjustment of the inequality indices used for calculating the Sen and Dagum mea-
sures. A large sample of Gini coeﬃcients has been regressed on income concepts and ref-
erence units to determine the eﬀect of diﬀerent underlying speciﬁcations (Table 3). Most
estimated parameters corroborate what one would expect. Gini coeﬃcients based on ex-
penditure data or net income are signiﬁcantly lower than those based on gross income. If
the inequality index has been adjusted for household composition, it is also signiﬁcantly
lower. A somewhat surprising result that turns out to be robust across diﬀerent samples
and speciﬁcations is that indices based on household level as the reference unit are sig-
niﬁcantly higher compared to the baseline case (i.e. per person). Theoretically, one would
have expected that pooling income will lead to lower inequality.
In order to arrive at comparable inequality indices, we use the regression results to calcu-
late adjusted Gini coeﬃcients which are based on gross income per person. All calculations
reported later on used both the original and adjusted Gini coeﬃcients for comparative
purposes.
The analysis of subjective welfare measures is based on the World Values Survey (Ingle-
hart, 1998) and the European Values Study (Inglehart, 2003).9 The surveys have been
designed to investigate sociocultural and political change. By today, four waves have been
carried out, covering a time span of almost 20 years. Due to data limitations, the range of
countries surveyed in the EVS and WVS diﬀers somewhat from our sample on economic
welfare measures. Table 4 gives an overview.
On average, 1500 people have been interviewed in each country. They were asked to assess
the political system of their country, whether they are satisﬁed with the government, about
their family situation, the relationship with neighbours and friends, religious matters, to
mentioned just a few aspects of the surveys. As indicators of subjective well-being, we
choose the following two questions:
9For alternative data on happiness, please refer to the Database of Happiness (Veenhoven, 2004).
8A) Taking all things together, would you say you are:
1 = very happy
2 = quite happy
3 = not very happy
4 = not at all happy






From the individual data we calculated mean values for ’Happiness’ and ’Life satisfaction’
for each country in each time period. In order to explore the relationship between the sub-
jective welfare measures, mean income and income inequality, we added the corresponding
income per capita and inequality index to this second set of data.
Lastly, we use data from the Transmonee Project and Freedom House to assess progress in
non-income dimensions of well-being where we focus on life expectancy, under 5 mortality
rates, education, and indicators of political and civil liberties.
4 Results
4.1 Exploring Economic Welfare
We compare welfare levels in transition countries in two ways. First, we compare coun-
tries with their own past levels of welfare and then we show welfare levels compared to
comparable middle-income countries.
Compared to Figure 1, Figure 2 shows a much more negative assessment of changes in
welfare in transition countries. While 6 transition countries had experienced higher income
levels in 2002, once inequality is considered, three of them (Estonia, Czech Republic
and Slovak Republic) are no longer better oﬀ than before due to the negative welfare
9consequences of rising inequality. More importantly, the declines in well-being in countries
that experienced a decline in per capita incomes are much larger when the rising inequality
is considered. In many of the successor states of the Soviet Union, the well-being declines
are 10-30 percentage points larger when inequality is considered.
As already suggested by Gruen and Klasen (2001), these results are heavily aﬀected by the
correlation between output decline and inequality increase in transition countries. Figure
3 plots the change in inequality versus the change in income experienced by the transition
countries between 1988 and 2002. The scatter diagram suggests a negative correlation
between the two variables which ampliﬁes the welfare losses in those countries.10
Table 5 compares transition countries to other middle-income countries using the pure
income based measure of welfare as well as four distribution-sensitive indicators for the
pre-transition period. The country speciﬁc welfare levels are ranked according to the
absolute values of the respective measure of well-being. The columns with the distribution-
adjusted measures calculate the ratio of inequality-adjusted welfare levels to GNI/capita
(reported in the ﬁrst column) to give a sense of the implied well-being ’penalty’ for
income inequality. Comparing the real income comparison presented here to our earlier
assessment (Gruen and Klasen, 2001, Table 1), the change of the income concept leads to a
somewhat diﬀerent ranking.11 A number of (pre-)transition countries attain considerably
higher welfare ranks (e.g. Lithuania, Turkmenistan, Romania, Bulgaria), Uzbekistan and
Kyrgyz Republic on the contrary reach somewhat lower ranks. Similarly, Latin American
countries like Venezuela, Colombia, and Brazil seem to be less rich according to the income
measure applied in the present study (GNI per capita, PPP adjusted (WDI, 2004)).
The disaggregated view at to-be successor states reveals that economic performance, mea-
sured by the average income, varied notably within the Soviet Union. In our sample,
Uzbekistan, Kyrgystan and Moldova are among the poorest regions, whereas the Baltic
republics and Russia range in the top ten.
When the income distribution is accounted for, except for Poland all transition countries
managed to either keep their welfare rank (e.g. Russia, Lithuania) or improve it, some
of them dramatically.12 This is due to the much lower inequality that prevailed in those
countries, especially when compared to other middle income countries. On the top end,
10When running regressions, the R2 averages at 19 percent which is lower than the correlation we had
found in Gruen and Klasen (2001). This suggests that during the initial output collapse the correlation
between output loss and inequality increase was particularly strong.
11See also footnote 1.
12Poland drops by two ranks because it has a very similar income level than Bulgaria and Romania
but slightly higher inequality.
10Czech Republic surpasses Slovenia and Spain once inequality is factored in.13 China keeps
the lowest welfare level according to all indicators. Regarding the middle income range,
high inequality Latin American countries as well as Turkey have lower ranks once the
distribution-sensitive measures of well-being are looked at. In fact, relative welfare of
Brazil and Mexico deteriorates most as they drop by 10 and 8 ranks, respectively, when
referring to the Atkinson ( = 2) measure.
The actual welfare loss varies considerably across the distribution sensitive measures.14 Sen
and Atkinson (=1) measures incur relatively small welfare losses, ranging between 7 and
30 per cent for transition countries. For Panama, Columbia, Brazil, and Mexico already
these mildly penalising measures reduce welfare by more than 50 per cent. Turning to the
Atkinson (=2) and Dagum measures, welfare levels are only about a third or even less
than the original levels for some of these countries. With respect to transition countries,
applying measures that imply a rather heavy penalty for inequality reduces their welfare
by no more than 30 to 40 per cent. This can be mainly attributed to the relatively high
income share accruing to the poorest 20 per cent of the population, which leads to a much
lower penalty in the Atkinson measure.
The diﬀerent income and inequality levels lead to signiﬁcant rank reversals. Moldova, for
example, has a very low income rank (position 29) but climbs nine ranks according to
the Atkinson ( = 2) and Dagum measures. It surpasses countries like Brazil and Mexico
which have almost twice its average income.
Fourteen years later, the picture of absolute and relative welfare has changed signiﬁcantly
(see Table 6). Let us consider the pure income ranking ﬁrst. While a few transition coun-
tries, all of which EU accession countries including Latvia, Poland, Hungary, Estonia,
Slovak Republic and Slovenia have been able to maintain of even slightly improve their
ranks, the majority of transition countries have fallen behind, some dramatically. This
is particularly the case for the successor states of the former Soviet Union. Moldova, for
example, dropped by 4 positions, Russia by 7, Turkmenistan by 10, Ukraine by 15.
The decline of the ranks of many transition countries is due to the combination of falling
per capita income levels in those countries and rising income levels elsewhere. Success
stories of sharply improving positions due to rising incomes include China, Costa Rica,
Malaysia, Mexico, Panama, and Thailand.
13This result has to be interpreted with caution, since the income data for those countries do not come
from the same base year.
14Welfare losses in 1988 presented in Table 5 are identical to the one published in Gruen and Klasen
(2001, Table 1) since the same Gini coeﬃcients and income shares have been used.
11Turning to the distribution-adjusted measures accentuates the results as the eﬀects of
rising inequality are now considered as well. The welfare levels get more reduced when
inequality is accounted for. Welfare losses due to inequality incurred by transition coun-
tries now range between 10 and 45 per cent if the mildly penalising Atkinson ( = 1) and
Sen measures are applied. Even bigger ’penalties’ for inequality are associated with the
Atkinson ( = 2) and Dagum measures. Referring to the latter one, Estonia, Lithuania,
and Moldova only accomplish welfare levels less than half their respective real income per
capita. These losses due to inequality are between 3 and 25 percentage points larger in
transition countries in 2002 than they were in 1998, depending on the measure chosen.
Particularly extreme examples are Turkmenistan, which lose 20 percentage points in the
Atkinson (e=2) measure, and Russia, which loses an addition 24 percentage points in the
Dagum measure. With a welfare reduction by more than 60 per cent, Russia is suﬀering
from such an unequal income distribution that is comparable to Costa Rica, Peru, the
Philippines, and Thailand who traditionally had higher income inequality.
Fewer transition countries are able to improve on welfare ranks when moving from a real
income comparison to the distribution sensitive measures. The majority either maintains
the same position across all measures or moves up (or down) by one rank only (Baltic
countries, Central European countries). As a result, the decline in ranks is even sharper in
some countries when the distribution-adjusted measures are considered. Examples include
Moldova and Kyrgyz Republic which both slip by 14 and 3 ranks more between 1988 and
2002 when the distribution-sensitive Dagum and Atkinson measures are used than with
the real income ranks.15
In 2002, we ﬁnd three successor states of the Soviet Union far behind at the bottom
end of all welfare rankings. During transition, especially Moldova and Kyrgyz Republic
experienced plummeting income and sharply increasing inequality which put them in the
last position. Compared to the pre-transition benchmark, Moldova experienced the worst
deteroriation by having less than half the average income in 2002 and slipping by fourteen
ranks according to the Atkinson ( = 2) and Dagum measures.
The results of this assessment are similar to what was found earlier in Gruen and Klasen
(2001). This is quite worrying as several years of relatively high growth in many transition
countries have not been able to bring transition countries close to the economic welfare
level they had experienced just prior to the transition. Only some countries in EU accession
countries Central and Eastern Europe have been able to get close to or slightly surpass
their welfare levels prior to the transition. At the same time, even those countries have not
15For quite a few countries, the worsening income distribution does not lead to a further penalty in
terms of their rank as the rank is partly driven by the included sample and the proximity of diﬀerent
countries in these ranks.
12so far been able to signiﬁcantly reduce the gap to the other countries of the EU. For most,
the gap in terms of welfare levels is now larger than it was at the start of the transition
process.
4.2 Subjective Well-Being
In Figures 4 and 5, we plot the mean values for the subjective welfare measures against per
capita income. Clearly, both indicators are positively correlated with income: on average,
people who enjoy higher mean incomes are happier and more satisﬁed with their life. At
the same time, there is a great deal of dispersion that is worth investigating further.
Table 7 shows the two indicators of subjective well-being by time period and distinguishes
between transition and non-transition countries. Regarding the changes over time for the
whole sample, both indicators point to the same direction: in 1999, people were less happy
and less satisﬁed than two decades ago. Interestingly, the trends for the two country groups
are diﬀerent. Subjective well-being in non-transition countries has hardly changed at all
and levels of subjective well-being were always somewhat higher. In transition countries,
on the contrary, at least with respect to life satisfaction, people report a decline over the
years. 16 None of these changes are, however, statistically signiﬁcant. Only the diﬀerences
in SWB measures emerging between transition and non-transition countries are signiﬁcant.
For all years considered, people living in non-transition countries are happier and enjoy a
more satisﬁed life than people from the former socialist bloc.
In order to determine to what extent this result may be driven by the change in income and
inequality, we continue with an econometric analysis. To explore the correlation between
subjective well-being and income and income inequality, we ﬁrst run a number of pooled
regressions. Table 8 presents the results. Columns (1) and (5) conﬁrm what has already
been clear from Figures 4 and 5: The higher the income, the higher subjective well-
being. Adding a measure of inequality yields a somewhat surprising result. Controlling
for income, people living in more unequal societies report higher levels of happiness and
life satisfaction. The eﬀect seems to be small in size, but is highly signiﬁcant.
Could the composition of our sample be responsible for this unexpected outcome? In
particular, the question arises whether this result is driven by the correlation between
low happiness and life satisfaction and (still) relatively low inequality in most transition
countries. After adding control variables for transition countries and developed countries,
16The lowest level is achieved in 1995-97 and it has since improved slightly which is closely correlated
with the development of our well-being measures.
13inequality has no longer a signiﬁcant impact on SWB, but there is a clear indication
that people in transition countries state lower levels of subjective well-being. Lastly, we
explicitly test for the impact of inequality in transition countries. The results in column (8)
indicate that higher inequality in transition countries leads to a lower level of subjective
well-being, at least as far as the indicator life satisfaction is concerned.17
A second set of regressions follows the idea of Easterlin (1995) and Oswald (1997) that
instead of focussing on the absolute levels, one should rather try to explain changes in
well-being. Table 9 presents the results of ﬁxed eﬀects panel estimations on life satisfaction
only.18 The results corroborate the impression received earlier. The change in inequality
towards a more unequal distribution for most transition countries results in a signiﬁcantly
lower quality of life.
Thus our analysis of subjective well-being conﬁrms that the rise in inequality in transition
countries has reduced subjective well-being, consistent with our treatment of inequality in
the inequality-adjusted measures. Two more surprising results are that people in transition
countries report lower levels of subjective well-being which merits further investigation. As
there are few data points prior to the transition for these countries, it is unclear whether
this is a transition-speciﬁc eﬀect or not. Second, inequality only reduces subjective well-
being in transition countries but not generally. This result should be treated with some
caution though as is based on a rather aggregative analysis.
4.3 Further Aspects of Welfare
In Table 10 we examine trends in non-income measures of well-being for transition coun-
tries. Here the record is also mixed, but generally somewhat more positive than with the
inequality-adjusted income-based and subjective measures.
As far as life expectancy is concerned, women have been able to slightly extend their life
expectancy from the already high levels they enjoyed prior to transition (Klasen, 1993). In
a few successor states of the Soviet Union, there were some declines. The picture for males
is much more negative with declines in longevity in 7 countries and stagnation in a further
17This is in line with previous research. Suhrcke (2001) analyses whether preferences for income in-
equality diﬀer systematically between post-socialist countries and the Western world. His results show
that people living in transition countries are less tolerant towards existing income diﬀerences.
18Here, both the dependent and independent variables are measured in diﬀerences. One might argue,
the most appropriate way to analyse this question would be to have a level measure of SWB on the left
hand side and changes in income and income inequality on the right hand side. Our sample size does not
allow this. For an attempt to run regressions of such type see Headey, Muﬀels, and Wooden (2004). They,
however, conclude that such equations usually yield weaker relationships.
142. The reasons for these gender-speciﬁc eﬀects have been analyzed in the literature (Paci,
2002). This literature suggests that the uncertainty and economic and social crisis brought
about by the transition have worsened diseases as well as dangerous behavioral patterns
among males (esp. relating to alcohol abuse) with signiﬁcant mortality consequences.
The picture is more favorable for under ﬁve mortality which has fallen in all transition
countries. Thus child health seems to have been much less aﬀected by the negative eﬀects
of transitions than adult health.
Turning to education, the record is more mixed again. In several countries, particularly
those aﬀected by severe income declines, there have been large declines in educational
enrolments. This reduces well-being directly as it denies educational opportunities to
many children. It will also negatively aﬀect economic development in the future.
Lastly, we consider some indicators of political and civil rights. Here the picture is (as
already shown in Gruen and Klasen (2001)) quite positive, compared to the pre-transition
period. Virtually all transition countries have moved from not free to at least partially free
societies. The big exception are the Central Asian former republics of the Soviet Union
and Belarus which remain unfree to this date.
Thus measuring well-being in a non-income dimension suggests that transition countries
have had some progress, notably in the health and political sphere. But the progress is
not universal and there have been deteriorations in health and education and stagnation
in political freedom in those countries where economic well-being had also declined the
most.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we examined trends in well-being in transition countries. After 15 years
of transition, most transition countries have not regained the level of well-being they
enjoyed at the start of the transition. This is true regardless of whether inequality-adjusted
income measures, subjective measures of well-being, or some non-income measures (such
as enrolments or life expectancy) are concerned.
At the same time, there is a great deal of variation between transition countries. In partic-
ular, those countries that joined the EU, have witnessed some improvements in well-being
although most are not any closer to the EU average than they had been in 1990. In con-
trast, in most of the successor states of the Soviet Union, the welfare impact of transition
15continues to be negative. Incomes are lower, inequality is larger (and thus inequality-
adjusted well-being has fallen signiﬁcantly), subjective well-being is lower, mortality is
higher, enrolments are lower, and even political freedoms are not signiﬁcantly better in
quite a few states. Moreover, not only are people in the countries not better oﬀ than
before, but they have fallen further behind compared to other middle-income countries in
the world.
It remains to be seen when the negative welfare eﬀects of transition will be overcome for
the majority of the aﬀected populations. It may well be that this is still far into the future.























































































































































































Notes: Source: Real GNI per capita, PPP adjusted, 2002 prices (WDI, 2004). Income data for 1988 were
not available for all countries. Instead, we used the data of 1989 for Kazakhstan and Russia; 1990 for
Belarus, Czech Republic, Lithuania, and Poland; 1993 for Slovenia.
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Notes: Happiness scores: 1 = very happy, 2 = quite happy, 3 = not very happy, 4 = not at all happy.































































































Notes: Scale for life satisfaction runs from 1 to 10 with 1 = dissatisﬁed, 10 = satisﬁed.
20Table 1: Income inequality in transition countries, 1988 and 2002
Original Gini Adjusted Gini
Country 1988 2002 2002
Bulgaria 23.3 31.9 29.1
Belarus 22.8 30.4 33.0
Czech Republic 19.4 25.4 22.6
Estonia 23.0 37.6 34.9
Hungary 21.0 25.3 24.0
Kazakhstan 25.7 31.2 33.9
Kyrgyz Republic 26.0 29.0 31.7
Lithuania 22.5 36.3 39.0
Latvia 22.5 32.4 29.6
Moldova 24.1 36.2 38.9
Poland 25.6 31.6 34.3
Romania 23.3 30.3 32.9
Russian Federation 23.8 45.6 48.3
Slovak Republic 19.5 25.8 23.0
Slovenia 21.5 28.4 25.6
Turkmenistan 26.4 40.8 43.5
Ukraine 23.3 29.0 31.7
Uzbekistan 28.2 26.8 29.5
Notes: These data have been used for the calculation of welfare measures
shown in Tables 5 and 6. Gini coeﬃcients in 1988 are based on gross
income per person and do not need to get adjusted (Milanovic, 1998).
Table 2: Alternative Gini coeﬃcients
Pre-transition period Post-transition period
Estonia 27.8 (I G Hpc) 37.8 (I N Hpc)
Kyrgyz Republic 31.2 (I G Hpc) 40.5 (I - P)
Russian Federation 26.4 (I G Hpc) 34.6 (E - Hpc)
Turkmenistan 31.6 (I G Hpc) 42.1 (E - Hpc)
Uzbekistan 30.6 (I G Hpc) 44.7 (E - Hpc)
21Table 3: Determinants of Gini Coeﬃcients
Expenditure -3.18∗∗ (0.36)
Net income 0.97∗ (0.46)
Unknown income 1.78∗ (0.80)
Household 1.19∗∗ (0.27)
Family 0.65 (0.44)
Unknown reference unit -0.97 (1.26)
Equivalized -4.47∗∗ (0.30)
Primary source unknown 2.05∗∗ (0.63)
No consistent source -0.27 (0.24)







Notes: Country ﬁxed eﬀects regression.
Signiﬁcance levels: ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
Table 4: Data samples
Economic Subjective well-being
Country Code well-being 1981 1990 1995-97 1999
Argentina ARG - X X X -
Australia AUS - X - X -
Belarus BLR X - X X X
Belgium BEL - X X - X
Brazil BRA X - X X -
Bulgaria BGR X - X X X
Canada CAN - X X - -
Chile CHL - - X X -
China CHN X - X X -
Colombia COL X - - - -
Costa Rica CRI X - - - -
Czech Republic CZE X - - - X
Denmark DNK - X X - X
Estonia EST X - X X X
Finland FIN - X X X X
France FRA - X X - X
Hungary HUN X X X - X
Iceland ICE - X X - X
India IND - - X X -
Indonesia IDN X - - - -
Ireland IRL - X X - X
Italy ITA - X X - X
Jamaica JAM X - - - -
Japan JPN - X X X -
Kazachstan KAZ X - - - -
continued on next page
22Table 4: continued
Economic Subjective well-being
Country Code well-being 1981 1990 1995-97 1999
Kirgistan KGZ X - - - -
Latvia LVA X - X X X
Lithuania LTU X - X X X
Malaysia MYS X - - - -
Mexico MEX X X X X -
Moldova MDA X - - - -
Netherlands NLD - X X - X
Nigeria NGA - - X X -
Norway NOR - X X X -
Panama PAN X - - - -
Peru PER X - - - -
Philippines PHL X - - - -
Poland POL X - X X X
Portugal PRT X - - - X
Romania ROM X - - - X
Russia RUS X - X X X
Slovakia SVK X - - - X
Slovenia SVN X - X X X
South Africa ZAF - X X X -
South Korea KOR - - X - -
Spain ESP X X X X X
Sweden SWE - X X X X
Switzerland CHE - - X X -
Thailand THA X - - - -
Turkey TUR X - X X X
Turkmenistan TKM X - - - -
Ukraine UKR X - - - X
United Kingdom GBR - X X X -
USA USA - X X X -
Uzbekistan UZB X - - - -






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1981 1.84 (0.17) 2.14 (-) 1.82 (0.15)
1990 2.01 (0.29) 2.41 (0.18) 1.87 (0.17)
1995-1997 1.97 (0.29) 2.34 (0.20) 1.81 (0.13)
1999 2.08 (0.34) 2.32 (0.20) 1.81 (0.24)
Life satisfaction
1981 7.47 (0.58) 6.94 (-) 7.49 (0.58)
1990 7.00 (0.86) 5.87 (0.49) 7.40 (0.55)
1995-1997 6.53 (1.13) 5.17 (0.83) 7.13 (0.59)
1999 6.51 (1.20) 5.69 (0.83) 7.40 (0.85)
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